Texas grievance lawyer dating party
He further stated that the cost of his services had amounted to approximately ,000, but, because the trial court did not award attorney's fees to Terry, he ultimately released her from the balance that she owed.
Additionally, the defendant testified that he had worked out a quid pro quo with Terry where she would work for his law office in exchange for some of the money she owed him.
He also gave her legal advice about her divorce, “educating her about her rights, about remedies,” despite his knowledge that she had an attorney, whom the defendant held “in high regard” and with whose representation he did not want to interfere.
The defendant testified that he had an intimate relationship with Terry but that they did not engage in sexual intercourse.
The defendant was there with his girlfriend, Sharon [Wise], and struck up a conversation with the Alianos.
The couples exchanged phone numbers and began seeing one another as couples, in a social capacity.
Thereafter, in June, 2010, the defendant started seeing Terry alone, going on walks in the park together, going to movies, for drinks and began ‘dating.’“The defendant had an ‘intimate’ relationship with Terry․ He believed he had an obligation to help her proceed with her divorce, and promote her welfare and make her a happier person.“The Superior Court possesses inherent authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline the members of the bar․ The judiciary has the power to admit attorneys to practice and to disbar them ․ to fix the qualifications of those to be admitted ․ and to define what constitutes the practice of law․ In the exercise of its disciplinary power, the Superior Court has adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility [now the Rules of Professional Conduct]․“Disciplinary proceedings are for the purpose of preserving the courts from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them․ The proceeding to disbar [or suspend] an attorney is neither a civil action nor a criminal proceeding, but is a proceeding sui generis, the object of which is not the punishment of the offender, but the protection of the court․ Once the complaint is made, the court controls the situation and procedure, in its discretion, as the interests of justice may seem to it to require․ [T]he power of the courts is left unfettered to act as situations, as they may arise, may seem to require, for efficient discipline of misconduct and the purging of the bar from the taint of unfit membership. 472, 478–79, 91 A.3d 932 (2014).“Additionally, because the applicable standard of proof for determining whether an attorney has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct is clear and convincing evidence ․ we must consider whether the [fact finder's] decision was based on clear and convincing evidence.” (Citation omitted.) Briggs v. When questioned by the court, however, he asserted that his conversations with Terry were privileged because he is an attorney.Such statutes as ours are not restrictive of the inherent powers which reside in courts to inquire into the conduct of their own officers, and to discipline them for misconduct․ In [disciplinary] proceedings ․ therefore, the attorney's relations to the tribunal and the character and purpose of the inquiry are such that unless it clearly appears that his rights have in some substantial way been denied him, the action of the court will not be set aside upon review․“[T]he clearly erroneous standard ․ is the preferable standard of review in attorney grievance appeals․ The clearly erroneous standard of review provides that [a] court's determination is clearly erroneous only in cases in which the record contains no evidence to support it, or in cases in which there is evidence, but the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Chief Dis ciplinary Counsel v. The defendant also testified that he started spending time alone with Terry in June, 2010, and they began dating, going on walks in a park together, going to movies, and going out for drinks.The defendant testified that he had a retainer agreement with Terry that called for his standard charging rate of either 0 or 0 per hour, and that Terry had paid him a retainer of ,000—00 of which went to his fees, and 00 of which was applied to other fees and costs.He also stated that he had put his bankruptcy practice on hold so that he could devote his full attention to the Aliano case.